Partnership And Cooperation Agreement Eu China

Another obstacle to the terms of EU competition stems from its differing preferences towards China. Under the existing CPAs, the EU appears to be in favour of a single comprehensive agreement that will enhance the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (EEA) and “cover both the commercial and political dimensions of relations”. [11] And in both dimensions, the EU has very different priorities with China. On trade and trade, the EU`s main interest is to push China to comply with WTO obligations and to protect its trade and investment in China. That is why the EU has set priorities in the negotiations: the trade deficit, exchange rates, restrictions on the export of raw materials, market access, intellectual property rights, services, investments, subsidies, public procurement, standards and standards. [12] None of these priorities is easy to meet on the Chinese side, reducing the EU`s willingness to earn profits. With regard to the political dimension, there are also significant challenges to overcome on the most sensitive issues concerning “democracy, human rights, the rule of law, Taiwan, the arms embargo, non-proliferation, disarmament and the International Criminal Court”. [13] The EU is trying to link the trade agreement to the political issues of human rights and democracy, over which China has great reservations and different priorities. According to Putnam, “politicization often activates groups that are less concerned about the cost of a non-agreement, thereby reducing effective profitability.” [14] The European Parliament`s insistence on introducing human rights clauses in the CPA therefore risks reducing the EU`s will to profit.

They lay the basis for the strategic partnership BETWEEN the EU and China, which has developed from trade and economic cooperation, to integrate security and security issues and address international challenges, such as climate change and global economic governance. Borght Kim Van Der – Zhang Lei, “The Current Legal Foundation and Prospective Legal Framework of the PCA,” in J. Men – G. Balducci (Eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st Century: the Partnership and Cooperation agreement, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2010. The participating Member States were then the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. From 2010 (when the second phase of the project was launched), other EU Member States joined the EU: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. This project aims to test the security and security recommendations of the World Customs Organization`s standard framework for containers and to facilitate the exchange of customs data, risk management cooperation, mutual recognition of customs controls and trade partnership programmes. The 120 trade routes, which involve 200 economic operators between 16 seaports, will no doubt facilitate trade between China and participating EU countries, as the loading and unloading of containers will require less control and customs assistance. At the end of the 9th Helsinki Summit in 2006, the EU and China decided in 2007 to launch negotiations on a CPA that will “reflect the full breadth and depth of today`s global EU-China strategic partnership… All of their bilateral relations, including strengthening cooperation on political issues. [2] Given the establishment of a “strategic partnership” and the growing scope of cooperation between the EU and China, it is desirable that both sides base their relations on a broader regulatory framework.

Both sides were therefore optimistic that positive outcomes would be achieved in the negotiations. But despite the dynamism at the beginning and much of the discussions that ended in 2009, the negotiations have been less easy and stalled for years.

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